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MONETIZING THE BENEFITS OF RISK AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
W. Kip Viscusi*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Should the benefits of risk and environmental regulations be monetized?  
For economists, this question is not controversial.  Benefits of government 
policies have a value given by society’s willingness to pay for these 
benefits, which by its very nature poses the valuation issue in monetary 
terms.1  Government agencies have likewise not shied away from 
monetizing these benefits.2  A contrary school of thought, however, has 
recently emerged, as reflected in the book by Frank Ackerman and Lisa 
Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value 
of Nothing.3
My point of view is the opposite of that of adherents of the Priceless 
approach.  Monetizing risk and environmental benefits does not devalue 
these outcomes, but rather gives them real economic value when the effects 
might otherwise be ignored.  Through monetization, policymakers are able 
to count these policy consequences fully and in accordance with the values 
  As the title of the book suggests, the authors oppose 
economists’ attempts to monetize the value of environmental amenities and 
the value of risks to life and health.  In this article, I will review the history 
of how monetization of benefits came to be the norm for government 
policy and explore some of the key economic debates that have arisen. 
 
* John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.  University 
Distinguished Professor of Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law School (Effective July 1, 
2006). 
Professor Viscusi’s research is supported by the Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics, and Business.  Alan Carlin, Chris Dockins, and Adam Scales provided helpful 
comments. 
 1. For a discussion of benefit assessment principles, see policy analysis texts such as 
EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 149-51 (1978). 
 2. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 4 (2004) (discussing the EPA’s removal 
of lead in gasoline after determining the health benefits of this action in monetary value). 
 3. See id. at 8.  For a general critique of their book, see ROBERT W. HAHN, IN DEFENSE 
OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION (2005). 
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attached to these outcomes by the citizens affected by the policy.  This is 
not to say that there are no controversies that remain once the monetization 
approach has been adopted.  This Article will explore many of the most 
sensitive and problematic concerns, including how we should value risks to 
life, whether old people or rich people should be accorded different values 
of life, and the proper role of survey methods in benefit valuations.  The 
existence of such controversies arises because the economic approach 
confronts these policy matters directly and incorporates recognition of how 
these concerns are valued by the citizenry.  In contrast, the Priceless 
approach in effect disenfranchises the citizens by abandoning the societal 
willingness-to-pay approach to benefits.  With no effort to quantify 
citizens’ valuations, the policy process will be guided by the subjective 
preferences of policymakers. 
From an economic standpoint, the advantages of monetizing benefits are 
quite strong because establishing this kind of metric makes it much easier 
to compare benefits with costs and thus make choices across various policy 
alternatives.4
Monetization also has an additional practical benefit in a world of 
regulatory impact analysis.  Costs are quantifiable in dollar terms, as are 
many benefit components, so failing to place a monetary value on 
seemingly intangible benefits such as environmental amenities may lead to 
inadequate attention to intangible benefits in the policy choice process.  
Monetizing these benefits puts them on equal footing with benefits that are 
perceived to have real economic value because they can be quantified in 
dollar terms. 
  For example, if we have $10 million to spend, is it more 
worthwhile to clean up a hazardous waste site on Long Island, or to reduce 
water pollution levels in Wisconsin rivers by ten percent, or to adopt safety 
measures that will lead to an average of three fewer schoolchildren being 
killed in school bus crashes?  Because society’s resources are limited, 
ultimately we must be making choices such as these across different policy 
domains.  To assess which regulatory interventions make sense and which 
do not, it is essential to have a scorecard by which it is feasible to make 
such comparisons. 
It is useful at the outset to make clear the target of my discussion.  From 
an economic standpoint, for something to be “priceless” means that it has 
an infinite value.  Thus, if saving the snail darter is priceless, no amount of 
monetary cost should be spared in preserving these fish, even if it depletes 
the entire GDP.  Because no risk or environmental benefit warrants an 
 
 4. See HAHN, supra note 3, at 44 (discussing how scorecards make the regulatory 
process more transparent). 
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infinite expenditure, the practical policy issue is what level of monetary 
cost is justified to obtain the benefit.  With costs in dollar terms as our 
numeraire, the policy choice has the structure of involving an explicit or 
implicit decision that the value of the benefits exceeds that of the costs for 
the policy to be worthwhile.  Ackerman and Heinzerling oppose this 
monetization, as well as the cost-benefit approach, but are not clear on 
what operational substitute or policy criterion they favor.  However, it is 
doubtful that they consider any benefits to be truly “priceless” in the 
economic sense.5
It is useful to start with a bit of background regarding how benefit 
assessment became a central focus of the policy evaluation process.  
Beginning with the Reagan administration a quarter century ago, regulatory 
agencies have been required to assess the costs and benefits of proposed 
new regulations.
 
6  Although the economic principles underlying such 
benefit assessments are well-established, the appropriate methodologies for 
benefit assessment continue to evolve.7  Moreover, as the frontiers of the 
benefit valuation research are extended, new controversies have arisen with 
respect to the appropriate valuation of these benefits.8  The benefits 
associated with health, safety, and environmental risk regulations are 
particularly controversial because of their distinctive economic 
characteristics, such as the fact that one’s life cannot be replaced.9
The current regulatory oversight process administered by the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) is governed by Executive Order 12,866, which was issued 
by the Clinton administration and has remained in effect since 1993.
  Because 
these categories of benefits have been the focal point of the “priceless” 
debate, this paper examines an economic approach to monetizing health, 
safety, and environmental benefits, with a primary focus on the value of 
risks to life. 
10  This 
executive order requires that agencies assess regulatory benefits and costs 
and suggests that they explore possible monetization of these benefits.11
 
 5. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 985 (11th ed. 2003) (defining 
“priceless” as “having a value beyond any price”). 
  In 
particular, section 1(b)(6) states: “Each agency shall assess both the costs 
and the benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs 
 6. The Reagan administration executive order was Executive Order 12,291.  Exec. 
Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
 7. See HAHN, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
 8. See id. 
 9. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 8. 
 10. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 11. Id. at 51,736, 51,741. 
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and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only 
upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs.”12
For all major regulatory initiatives, Executive Order 12,866, section 
6(a)(C)(ii) requires that agencies undertake the following benefits analysis: 
 
An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of benefits anticipated 
from the regulatory action (such as, but not limited to, the promotion of 
the efficient functioning of the economy and private markets, the 
enhancement of health and safety, the protection of the natural 
environment, and the elimination or reduction of discrimination or bias) 
together with, to the extent feasible, a quantification of those benefits[.]13
In theory, government agencies could use a variety of possible metrics to 
measure benefits.  One could, for example, translate benefits into 
equivalent numbers of statistical lives that are saved, river miles for which 
the water quality is improved, endangered species that are saved, or some 
other metric.  The primary currency in which benefits are assessed is 
dollars because, ultimately, agencies are required to compare benefits and 
costs.  From the standpoint of maximizing social welfare, they should 
choose those regulations that provide the greatest net benefits to society, 
though their legislative mandates are often framed more narrowly.  Because 
costs are in financial terms, placing benefits in comparable terms would 
place them on equal footing and facilitate such comparison.  Moreover, 
most economic commodities are traded in markets and, as a consequence, 
explicit monetary prices are available.
 
14  As I will indicate below, many 
environmental commodities are traded implicitly in markets or have values 
that can be elicited through simulated market experiments, and, as a result, 
it is feasible to attach dollar values to many seemingly unquantifiable 
benefits.15
The OMB has continued to emphasize the importance of monetizing 
benefits in the various reports it has issued in its efforts to outline the 
analytical underpinnings of regulatory impact assessment.  In its 2003 
OMB Circular A-4, OIRA reiterated the importance of quantifying 
benefits.  Its outline of the key elements of regulatory analysis included the 
following comment: 
 
 
 12. Id. at 51,736. 
 13. Id. at 51,741. 
 14. The central role of prices in markets is discussed in many textbooks, such as N. 
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 9 (4th ed. 2006). 
 15. The use of surveys and market experiments to derive implicit values of life are 
discussed in W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1912 (1993) [hereinafter Viscusi, Value of Risks]. 
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With this information, you should be able to assess quantitatively the 
benefits and costs of the proposed rule and its alternatives.  A complete 
regulatory analysis includes a discussion of non-quantified as well as 
quantified benefits and costs.  A non-quantified outcome is a benefit or 
cost that has not been quantified or monetized in the analysis.16
OMB expands on these requirements by emphasizing the importance of 
monetizing benefits from the standpoint of establishing comparability with 
costs: “A distinctive feature of BCA [Benefit-Cost Analysis] is that both 
benefits and costs are expressed in monetary units, which allows you to 
evaluate different regulatory options with a variety of attributes using a 
common measure.”
 
17
Even though monetization of benefits has become a standard operating 
procedure as part of regulatory policy assessment, there nevertheless are 
legitimate economic controversies that remain.  The remainder of the 
Article explores some of the ongoing debates within the economics 
community as well as the more salient critiques that non-economists have 
offered. 
 
The Value of Statistical Life Concept 
Many might view it as immoral to place a value on human life.  That 
task is fortunately not before us.  What we face is the closely-related task of 
valuing the reduction of small risks to life.  How much is society willing to 
pay to reduce the risk of cancer from hazardous waste exposures by one 
chance in 10,000 for a person exposed to the risk over a thirty-year period?  
Structuring our approach to answer questions such as these is 
straightforward based on the fundamental guidelines for benefit 
assessment.  The governing principle for benefit assessment generally, as 
well as for benefit assessment for regulatory policies, is the value of the 
benefit in terms of society’s willingness to pay for these benefits.18
 
 16. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 3 (Sept. 17, 
2003) [hereinafter OMB, CIRCULAR A-4], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
  
 17. Id. at 10. 
 18. CIRCULAR A-4 makes the following observation: 
“Opportunity cost” is the appropriate concept for valuing both benefits and costs.  
The principle of “willingness-to-pay” (WTP) captures the notion of opportunity 
cost by measuring what individuals are willing to forgo to enjoy a particular 
benefit.  In general, economists tend to view WTP as the most appropriate 
measure of opportunity cost, but an individual’s “willingness-to-accept” (WTA) 
compensation for not receiving the improvement can also provide a valid measure 
of opportunity cost. 
Id. at 18. 
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Applying this concept to health, safety, and environmental regulations, the 
appropriate benefit value is society’s willingness to pay for the risk 
reduction or environmental improvement that will result from the policy.  
The methodology that equates benefits with society’s willingness to pay for 
the change in policy outcomes by its very nature is conceptually closely 
linked to potential monetization of benefits. 
What benefit outcome being valued depends on the policy context.  For 
some environmental policies, the benefit outcome is quite concrete.  As a 
result of a policy preventing pollution near national parks, visibility in 
those areas will improve.19
This willingness-to-pay principle links up quite directly with 
economists’ approach to valuing risks to life and health, but not to fatality 
valuation methodologies used for other purposes, such as compensation for 
victims of wrongful death.
  In most instances of health, safety, and 
environmental regulations that I have seen, the benefit is defined in terms 
of a distribution of possible outcomes.  Thus, if a regulation by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will lead to benefits in terms of 
ten reduced expected cancer deaths per year, then the benefit outcome to be 
valued is the number of statistical lives that are saved, which for this 
example is ten.  We do not know in advance which particular people will 
be saved by the regulation, nor do we know that exactly ten people will be 
saved every year.  It could be more or less than ten, but our best estimate 
based on the dose-response relationship for the chemicals being reduced 
and the levels of exposures for these chemicals is that the mean value of the 
distribution of the number of lives that will be saved is ten. 
20  The early studies on the value of life equated 
the value of people’s lives to the present value of their lost earnings, as in 
the case of court awards for personal injury.21  This approach has the 
advantage of being a magnitude that is easy to calculate.22
 
 19. See generally William D. Schulze et al., The Economic Benefits of Preserving 
Visibility in the National Parklands of the Southwest, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149 (1983); see 
also LAURAINE G. CHESTNUT & ROBERT D. ROWE, PRESERVATION VALUES FOR VISIBILITY 
PROTECTION AT THE NATIONAL PARKS, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/Geographic%20Area!OpenView&Start=117 
(follow “Yosemite National Park” hyperlink; then follow “Preservation Values for Visibility 
Protection at the National Parks (02/16/1990)” hyperlink). 
  All one needs is 
an estimate of individual earnings at different points in time, a measure of 
 20. These different approaches are contrasted in W. Kip Viscusi, Misuses and Proper 
Uses of Hedonic Values of Life in Legal Contexts, 13 J. FORENSIC ECON. 111 (2000) 
[hereinafter Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses]. 
 21. Dorothy P. Rice & Barbara S. Cooper, The Economic Value of Life, 57 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH & NATION’S HEALTH 1954, 1954-66 (1967). 
 22. See id. 
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work-life expectancy, and a rate of discount used to convert future earnings 
losses into present dollar terms.23  This approach to valuing life is 
appropriate for court cases in which compensation is paid to the surviving 
family members for a fatal accident and to the accident victim in the case 
of nonfatal accidents.24  In some instances, these present value of lost 
earnings calculations are also reduced by the taxes or the consumption 
value that the deceased would have had, where these rules differ by 
jurisdiction.25
It is noteworthy that these present-value calculations will have quite 
strong distributional consequences.  The simple mathematics is that if one’s 
annual earnings are doubled, then the present value of one’s lost earnings 
doubles as well.  Thus, court awards will be proportional to income levels, 
leading more affluent accident victims to receive higher levels of 
compensation than less affluent victims.  There is an underlying rationale 
for these differences and for the use of present value of lost earnings more 
generally to the extent that the function of such awards is to serve as 
insurance.
 
26  People with higher income have suffered a greater income 
loss than those with a lower income, so that to maintain their current 
economic standard, higher levels of compensation are needed.27  This line 
of analysis is quite compelling in the case of monetary losses, but in the 
case of irreplaceable health effects, it is not obvious that a disabled person 
with an annual income of $100,000 should receive twice the level of 
compensation as a disabled person with an annual income of $50,000.28
Although the present value of lost earnings approach is often pertinent 
for insuring the income losses of accident victims, it is not linked to the 
guiding principle for benefit assessment, which is society’s willingness to 
pay for the benefit.
  
Thus, the court-awarded compensation amounts are not immune from 
potential controversy with respect to their distributional consequences. 
29
 
 23. See id. at 1955-56. 
  In the case of a small risk of death, such as one in 
 24. See generally ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INJURY AND DEATH DAMAGES (Roger T. 
Kaufman et al. eds., 2005). 
 25. See STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH: ECONOMIC HANDBOOK 
2, 39 (2d ed. 1979); W. Cris Lewis & Tyler J. Bowles, Alternative Approaches to Tax 
Adjustments in Appraising Economic Loss, J. LEGAL ECON., Spring/Summer 1996, at 27. 
 26. Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses, supra note 20, at 117. 
 27. If the monetary loss is higher, the “make whole” amount will be greater.  See id. 
(explaining the “make whole” concept). 
 28. W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 195, 195-222 (2000), reprinted in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: 
SELECTED READINGS (Robert N. Stavins ed., 5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Viscusi, Legal 
Contexts]. 
 29. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 149-51. 
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100,000, a person with a lifetime income with a present value of $700,000 
might well be willing to pay more than seven dollars to eliminate this risk, 
even though seven dollars represents 1/100,000 of his or her lifetime 
wealth.  The appropriate matter of concern is the amount of money that the 
person is willing to pay to reduce the small probability of death, or the risk-
money tradeoff, and this amount is not limited to the fatality risk value 
multiplied by one’s lifetime wealth.30
Consider the following example that illustrates the fundamentals of the 
value of statistical life (“VSL”) concept.  Suppose that you are in a group 
of 100,000 people, and that one of you will die with certainty.  The risk of 
death is a random event that affects all people equally.  How much would 
you be willing to pay to eliminate this risk?  Suppose the answer is $70 for 
each person in the group.  What this value implies is that collectively, the 
group of 100,000 people would be willing to spend $7 million to eliminate 
the risk of one statistical death to their group.  Put in somewhat different 
terms, the willingness-to-pay value of seventy dollars divided by the risk 
reduction of one chance in 100,000 also equals $7 million.  Because we are 
dealing with the willingness to pay to reduce small probabilities of death, 
the $7 million value for statistical life need not be constrained by the 
present value of the person’s earnings.  The individual is not buying out of 
the risk of certain death, but rather is simply purchasing a minor reduction 
in the risk of death.  The value of statistical life that would be pertinent for 
much greater risk reductions would, of course, be potentially different, but 
the amount of risk reduction associated with government regulatory 
policies is typically quite low. 
  Such a constraint is binding for the 
certainty of death, but not for very small risks. 
Estimating the Value of Statistical Life 
There are two principal approaches that can be used to derive the value 
of the risk-money tradeoff that people have for fatality risks: survey 
approaches or statistical estimates of values implied by actual risk taking 
decisions.31  One could run a survey asking people their willingness to pay 
for a risk reduction.  Such contingent valuation or stated preference surveys 
present respondents with a hypothetical fatality risk situation and ask how 
much they would pay for a particular risk reduction.32
 
 30. Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses, supra note 
  A considerable 
literature has outlined requirements that such studies should meet to be 
20, at 115. 
 31. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1926-27 (for labor market estimates); 
id. at 1940 (for survey evidence). 
 32. Id. at 1939. 
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reliable, such as providing a credible scenario and payment mechanism to 
respondents.33  As discussed below, OMB has also detailed the 
requirements that stated preference studies should meet.34  Ultimately, 
however, stated preferences are not real decisions.35  To the extent that we 
can elicit values of statistical life based on actual choices that people make, 
then it is likely that these decisions will provide more reliable evidence of 
people’s valuation of real risks than would surveys’ valuations of 
hypothetical risks.36  Nevertheless, well-designed surveys often play a quite 
valuable role in deriving values for environmental commodities and health 
outcomes for which good market data are not readily available.37
The dominant source of evidence regarding VSL is derived from market 
data.
 
38  Although risks to life are not treated explicitly in markets, they are 
often bundled with other commodities that are in fact traded.39  Workers on 
hazardous jobs will receive compensating wage differentials for jobs that 
pose additional risk.  This theoretical approach, which was introduced by 
Adam Smith, pertains to other markets as well.40
It is worth noting at the outset that analyses of these various risk-money 
tradeoffs differ somewhat in the risk tradeoff they are measuring.  The 
labor market wage premium for fatality risks is a willingness to accept 
(“WTA”) measure.
  Product market prices 
will be lower for risky products, and housing prices will be lower for 
houses in more dangerous neighborhoods. 
41  How much must the worker get paid to be willing to 
incur a greater risk?  In contrast, for risky products and risky houses, the 
measure is a willingness to pay (“WTP”) measure, in that a person would 
be paying a higher price for the product or the house for a higher safety 
level.42
 
 33. W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 780-81 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS 
OF REGULATION]. 
  For very small changes in risk, the WTA and WTP measures of the 
 34. In particular, see OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 23. 
 35. Id. at 24 (“[Y]ou should prefer revealed preference data over stated preference data 
because revealed preference data are based on actual decisions, where market participants 
enjoy or suffer the consequences of their decisions.”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 22. 
 38. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical 
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 6 (2003) 
[hereinafter Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life]. 
 39. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1913-14. 
 40. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 115-17 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1776). 
 41. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1918 n.16. 
 42. Id. 
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risk-money tradeoff should be the same, from an economic standpoint.43  
However, in experimental contexts, often there is a considerable difference 
in these values, as the WTA often greatly exceeds the WTP value.44
There have been dozens of studies of VSL using labor market data from 
the United States as well as throughout the world.  The general approach 
researchers have used is to formulate a regression analysis model in which 
the worker’s wage rate is a function of a variety of demographic 
characteristics and job characteristics, including the fatality rate for the 
worker’s occupation and industry.
 
45  Based on a comprehensive survey of 
such studies in the United States, Viscusi and Aldy found that in year 2000 
U.S. dollars, the median value of statistical life was $6.7 million.46  If a 
typical worker in the United States faces an on-the-job fatality risk of one 
chance in 25,000, a $6.7 million value of life implies that that worker 
receives an extra $268 per year in compensation for the additional risk.47  
As one would expect, the estimates of VSL are lower in less affluent 
countries, such as South Korea, India, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.48
To what extent should we view wage-risk tradeoffs implied by small 
risks as being reliable?  While the fatality risks are now on the order of 
1/25,000 annually, in earlier studies the U.S. workplace was more 
dangerous, with risks on the order of 1/10,000.
 
49  The actual precision of 
such estimates should not be a matter for idle speculation.  From a 
statistical standpoint, all such estimates have an associated estimated error, 
and it is feasible to construct pertinent confidence intervals around these 
values.50
The estimates are reasonably robust and have remained quite stable over 
time, controlling for inflation.
 
51
 
 43. Id. (describing survey and results). 
  Similarly, VSL estimates based on labor 
market studies, product market studies, and housing market purchases all 
 44. For an example of extreme difference of this type, see W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. 
Magat & Joel Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple 
Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465 (1987). 
 45. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 
34-41 (1992) [hereinafter VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS]. 
 46. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 63 tbl.A. 
 47. Multiplying 1/25,000 and $6.7 million equals $268.  For similar examples, see 
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 719. 
 48. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 36. 
 49. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1913. 
 50. For an example of such confidence intervals see Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, 
The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION 
AND CONSUMPTION 265, 294 (Nestor R. Terleckyj ed., 1976). 
 51. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 18-21. 
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yield similar answers.52  Survey studies that specifically elicit WTP values 
for reductions in risk likewise generate estimates in the same range.53
Heterogeneity and VSL 
  
Thus, while the various estimates do not resolve whether VSL is $6 
million, $8 million, or $10 million, we can be quite confident that wildly 
different VSL numbers are not appropriate. 
The variables that affect differences in VSL accord with many of one’s 
expectations.  A principal implication of the Viscusi and Aldy 2003 meta-
analysis pertains to the income elasticity of VSL.54  In particular, they 
found that this income elasticity was in the range of 0.5 to 0.6, or put 
somewhat differently, a ten percent increase in one’s income will raise the 
value of one’s statistical life by five percent to six percent.55  The 
responsiveness of the VSL to income levels is positive, as one would 
expect.56
This positive income elasticity is consistent with other economic 
behaviors, given the positive relationship of a variety of health and safety 
expenditures with respect to individual income.
 
57  Note, however, that the 
percentage change in the VSL with respect to a percentage increase in 
income is less than proportional.58
Contrary to the claims by Ackerman and Heinzerling, the VSL 
methodology does not assume that all deaths are equally unattractive.
  In contrast, the present value of lost 
earnings measure is strictly proportional to one’s income.  The role of 
income elasticity will be quite central to subsequent discussions of 
appropriate recognition of distributional considerations pertaining to VSL. 
59  
For example, one would expect people to have a different value for death 
resulting from cancer as opposed to an accidental death on the job.  
Because market data are not well suited to making these distinctions, the 
emphasis instead has been on stated preference approaches in which people 
reveal their automobile death risk equivalent for a risk of cancer.60
 
 52. Id. at 19-21, 25 (tables of survey results). 
  We 
 53. VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 73. 
 54. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 36-43. 
 55. Id. at 37. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally William N. Evans & W. Kip Viscusi, Income Effects and the Value of 
Health, 28 J. HUM. RESOURCES 497, 497-518 (1993) (exploring the effect of income on 
willingness to pay for safer products to affect health). 
 58. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 37, 40 tbl.7. 
 59. Some confusion along these lines is exhibited in the discussion by Frank Ackerman 
and Lisa Heinzerling in ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 70. 
 60. See generally Wesley A. Magat, W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber, A Reference Lottery 
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have developed such estimates for both fatal and nonfatal cases of cancer.  
There have also been exploratory survey analyses of attitudes toward 
different types of deaths using a student convenience sample.61
Another possible approach to capturing differences in the quantity and 
quality of life is the quality-adjusted life years (“QALY”) methodology.  
This methodology seeks to take into account both the amount of life left as 
well as the quality of these life years, usually using some kind of stated 
preference format.
 
62  The QALY approach may also entail the use of third-
party experts rather than eliciting values of those actually affected by a 
policy.63  Although recognizing these two different aspects of longevity 
makes sense conceptually, the QALY methodology is not sound from an 
economic standpoint.64  For example, based on the QALY methodology, a 
twenty percent reduction in one’s lifespan would have the same value if 
one had five remaining years of life or fifty remaining years of life.65
Although $7 million is a consensus estimate for VSL based on labor 
market studies, the value of a statistical life is not a natural constant.
 
66  It 
may differ across time and across individuals.67  The VSL number simply 
represents the tradeoff people have exhibited between risk and money.68
On a theoretical basis, one should be consistent and strike the same 
fatality risk-cost tradeoff across all domains of one’s decisions, assuming 
that there are continuous risky choices available.  Some decisions are, of 
course, lumpy in that you either choose to wear a ski helmet or not to wear 
a ski helmet.  It is interesting, however, that the wide range of estimates of 
VSL from the product and housing market often yield similar estimates to 
those found in the labor market, despite the mix of individuals making the 
  
People may have quite different preferences regarding the balance they 
wish to strike, just as they do for other economic commodities.  Because of 
this heterogeneity, different samples of workers with a different mix of job 
risks and occupations often generate estimates of VSL that differ. 
 
Metric for Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1118 (1996). 
 61. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259 (1997). 
 62. See John M. Miyamoto et al., The Zero Condition: A Simplifying Assumption in 
QALY Measurement and Multiattribute Utility, 44 MGMT. SCI. 839 (1998). 
 63. Studies of medical decisions sometimes use patient populations, while other studies 
use health professionals.  See Patrick Hofstetter & James K. Hammitt, Selecting Human 
Health Metrics for Environmental Decision-Support Tools, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 965, 971-72 
(2002). 
 64. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 13. 
 65. For this critique and related comments on the QALY approach, see id. 
 66. See Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 28, at 205-08 (discussing VSL). 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
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choices being different and the frequent lumpiness of the decisions that are 
available in these contexts.69
The implied VSL revealed by personal decisions is in the range of $3.8 
million to $5.4 million for the purchase of used cars, $5.13 million based 
on a study of the purchase of new cars, at least $1 million based on seatbelt 
usage decisions, from $4.3 to $5 million based on housing price responses 
to the presence of hazardous waste sites, and at least $2.1 to $4.3 million 
based on the purchase of bike helmets.
 
70  Similarly, survey studies yield 
expressed willingness-to-pay values that are in the single-digit million 
dollar range.71
A particularly interesting manifestation of heterogeneous attitude toward 
risks is that of smokers.  Smoking is by far the greatest health risk that 
millions of consumers take.
 
72  To the extent that people are making 
consistent risk-taking decisions across different domains, one would also 
expect smokers to exhibit different and substantially lower risk-money 
tradeoffs than nonsmokers.73  Compared to nonsmokers, smokers are ten 
percent less likely to wear their seatbelts, five percent less likely to check 
their blood pressure, two times more likely to have a home accident, and 
are nine percent less likely to floss their teeth.74  Smokers also work on 
riskier jobs in terms of the average annual injury risk associated with the 
job.75  Moreover, controlling for the riskiness of the job, smokers are more 
likely to be injured.76  In terms of the value of statistical injury, which is 
the nonfatal risk analog of VSL, smokers exhibit an implicit value of 
$20,000 per statistical injury as compared to $39,000 for nonsmokers.77
In his commentary on my conference presentation of this paper, Adam 
Scales raised the interesting issue of differences in VSL by gender and 
  A 
sometimes difficult question for policy analysis is the extent to which 
personal differences in risk preferences such as these should be reflected in 
policy evaluations. 
 
 69. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 24-25. 
 70. See id. at 25. 
 71. The U.S. surveys reported in Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1940, are all 
in the single-digit range. 
 72. W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 1 
(2002) [hereinafter VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS]. 
 73. Most of the evidence here comparing smokers to nonsmokers is drawn from W. Kip 
Viscusi & Joni Hersch, Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 269, 
269 (2001); see generally VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 72. 
 74. VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 72, at 169. 
 75. See Viscusi & Hersch, supra note 73, at 274. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 276. 
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race.78  Consider first the case of labor market evidence on risk premiums 
for women.79  The compensating differential for risk question is twofold.  
First, do women work at risky jobs for which one would expect there to be 
a premium for the hazards posed by the job?  Second, is there evidence that 
in fact women do get paid more for jobs that pose additional health and 
safety risks?  Empirical analysis of gender-specific differences in risk 
levels indicates that women do work in jobs that often pose injury risks, but 
on average these jobs are safer than men’s jobs.80  Given that women face 
job risks, the labor market premiums for risk function in much the same 
way for women as for men.  Just as men receive compensating wage 
differentials for the job risks they face, female employees do as well.81
The more interesting demographic differences are with respect to race.  
In a recent article, I examined racial differences in fatality risk premiums, 
which in turn can be used to calculate how VSL levels vary by race.
 
82  
Black workers exhibited VSL levels that were below those of White 
workers.83  The more interesting aspect of the analysis was the exploration 
of the cause of these VSL differences.  These racial differences were not 
solely attributable to differences in workers’ attitudes toward risk, but 
rather, they could be traced to differences in market opportunities.84  White 
workers are choosing jobs from a different set of wage-risk combinations 
that is not available to Black workers.85  Insofar as the differences in VSL 
are a consequence of less attractive job options that are possibly the result 
of discriminatory effects, Black workers do not necessarily indicate a 
greater willingness to bear risk.86  An important caveat that should pertain 
to any attempt to recognize heterogeneity in VSL levels is that VSL studies 
of observed market risk tradeoffs reflect the influence of both market 
opportunities and preferences of those bearing the risk.87
 
 78. Adam Scales, Professor, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the Fordham 
Urban Law Journal Symposium: The Contemporary Regulatory State (Feb. 23, 2006). 
  Consequently, 
one should be cautious in attributing observed differences to risk 
 79. See generally Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job 
Injury Risks, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 598 (1998). 
 80. Id. at 606. 
 81. See id. at 598.  Note that this study examined injury rates and did not consider VSLs 
by gender. 
 82. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a 
Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 239 (2003). 
 83. Id. at 242. 
 84. Id. at 240. 
 85. Id. at 240-43. 
 86. Id. at 243. 
 87. Id. 
VISCUSI_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:25 PM 
2006] MONETIZING THE BENEFITS OF RISK 115 
preferences.88
Valuing Expected Lives Saved for Policy Analysis 
 
The watershed event that led to the use of the value-of-life methodology 
for regulatory benefit assessment was the 1982 debate between OSHA and 
OMB over the proposed new hazard communication regulation.89  OSHA 
prepared a regulatory impact analysis of this costly regulatory proposal, 
which for the first time would have required the labeling of dangerous 
chemicals in the workplace.90  Because, in OSHA’s view, life was too 
sacred to value, instead the agency calculated the cost of death for the 
workers whose lives would be saved by the proposed regulation.91  Using 
the present value of the workers’ lost earnings and medical costs as a 
measure of the benefits value led to a relatively low benefit assessment and 
a subsequent OMB challenge to the regulation.92  OSHA then appealed 
OIRA’s rejection of the regulation to then-Vice President Bush.93  I was 
asked by both parties to settle the dispute between the two agencies over 
the regulatory analysis.  By using my labor market estimates of the value of 
life as well as the implicit value of nonfatal injuries, I was able to show that 
benefits were approximately an order of magnitude greater than what 
OSHA had estimated.94  The result was that benefits exceeded costs based 
on a proper assessment of these health and safety benefits.95  The day after 
my report in favor of the regulation reached the Reagan White House, the 
regulation was issued.96
Since that time, there has been widespread adoption of the VSL 
approach throughout the federal government.
 
97  The methodology offers 
the advantage of being based on sound economic theory and empirical 
work, and has the practical benefit for regulatory agencies of making their 
regulations look much more attractive than they otherwise would had they 
continued to rely on the present value of lost earnings approach.98
 
 88. Id. 
 
 89. For a general description of this debate and of my role in it, see Pete Earley, What’s 
a Life Worth?, WASH. POST MAG., June 9, 1985, at 11; see also VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, 
supra note 45. 
 90. Earley, supra note 89, at 11-13. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 261-63. 
 94. See id. at 262-63. 
 95. Id. at 263. 
 96. Earley, supra note 89, at 13. 
 97. HAHN, supra note 3, at 24. 
 98. Id. at 35. 
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Armed with this methodology, do we then have a basis for approaching 
policy decisions involving identified lives, such as a girl trapped in a well 
or a coal miner trapped underground?  Should we apply the current VSL 
number of $7 million and save them only if the cost of doing so is below 
that amount?  In these instances, the policy is not saving statistical lives but 
identified lives.  Society’s willingness to pay to reduce the risk of death for 
identified victims from a one-hundred percent chance of death to the 
certainty of life may be quite different than our attitude toward reducing 
statistical deaths arising from very small probabilities. 
The identified girl in a well or trapped coal miner also have the 
advantage of substantial publicity that will evoke altruistic concerns.99  
Indeed, this altruism is often so great that the special status accorded to 
identified lives is not restricted to people; as a society we also have a 
review of the willingness to spend substantial sums to try to save the lives 
of beached whales.  Saving these identified lives also tends to be a 
relatively infrequent event, which may affect the extent of society’s broader 
altruistic interests.  Our willingness to pay to save identified lives may be 
reduced if we confronted as an identified life the possibility of saving the 
lives of each of the 44,600 people killed each year in motor-vehicle 
accidents.100
Age and the Senior Discount 
  The deaths of over 100 identified lives per day would surely 
generate less public attention per death than the rarer calamities that lead to 
trapped coal miners or sailors lost at sea. 
One of the most controversial contexts in which the heterogeneity of 
attitudes toward risk has surfaced has pertained to whether the lives of 
older people should be given a lower benefit value than for the young.  This 
general topic has come under the heading of a “death discount,” “senior 
death discount,” and “senior discount.”101  The policy context in which this 
debate arose was the EPA analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative, in which it 
applied a thirty-seven percent discount to the VSL benefit figure for those 
who are age sixty-five and older.102
 
 99. VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 
  The reason for the controversy was 
45, at 21. 
 100. The motor vehicle accident death toll is for 2004, from NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, 
TRAFFIC SAFETY STATISTICS 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.nsc.org/issues/driving/TrafficSafetyApr2005.pdf. 
 101. See among the following journalistic accounts of this debate John J. Fialka, EPA to 
Stop “Death Discount” to Value New Regulations, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2003, at D3; 
Katharine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, E.P.A. Drops Age-Based Cost Studies, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 8, 2003, at A34; Cindy Skrzycki, Under Fire: EPA Drops the “Senior Death 
Discount,” WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at E1. 
 102. The thirty-seven percent senior discount figure is from U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
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twofold.  First, there was the clearly sensitive issue of whether the lives of 
the elderly should be valued less than the lives of those younger than age 
sixty-five.103  Second, because the lion’s share of the benefits of the Clear 
Skies Initiative are for reducing fatalities among those aged sixty-five and 
over, the application of a senior discount has a nontrivial effect on the 
assessed benefits.104  In terms of the long-term exposure analysis, the 
reduced annual fatalities in the year 2010 would be 1,900 for those eighteen 
to sixty-four and 6,000 for those aged sixty-five and over.105  Application 
of this senior adjustment increases the undiscounted benefits in that year 
from $48.2 billion to $48.7 billion.106
Much of the confusion around the senior discount debate could have 
been avoided had the policy debate focused on first principles.  Are the 
lives of senior citizens worth less, and whose values count in such an 
assessment?  The key question is whether the willingness to pay to reduce 
fatality risks declines with age and, if so, by how much?  If all of us lived 
forever then there would be a quite legitimate concern about differentiating 
the VSL benefit value according to age.  However, with a finite lifespan, 
the reduced risk to life will save a different amount of the commodity based 
on one’s remaining life expectancy.  One’s willingness to pay to reduce a 
fatality risk is likely to vary with the amount of the remaining life, as sixty 
remaining life years is a larger commodity than a month or two of 
remaining life for individuals suffering from advanced respiratory failure. 
 
Treating the VSL differentially based on age may seem to some to be 
inequitable in that the lives of people are being valued differently.107
 
TECHNICAL ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES 
INITIATIVE 35-37 (2002) (noting a VSL of $3.7 million for those under age sixty-five and a 
VSL of $2.3 million for those sixty-five and older, a thirty-seven percent discount), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf.  The reduced annual 
fatalities figures for the regulation are from U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL 
ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES ACT OF 2003, 
at 64 (2003) [hereinafter EPA, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM 2003], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_addendum.pdf. 
  By 
the same token, one could claim that it is inequitable to value the risks to 
life for those who have a very short life expectancy at the same value as 
those who have a very long life expectancy, because doing so places a 
much higher premium per year of life saved for the old than for the 
 103. Skrzycki, supra note 101, at E1. 
 104. See W. KIP VISCUSI & JOSEPH E. ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES OF THE SENIOR 
DISCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE 1 (2006) [hereinafter VISCUSI & ALDY, 
LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES], available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-06-12.pdf. 
 105. EPA, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM 2003, supra note 102, at 64. 
 106. VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 782. 
 107. See Seelye & Tierney, supra note 101, at A34. 
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young.108
A sounder basis for determining the appropriate benefit value is not to 
make appeals to one of these two equity considerations, or to speculate on 
how the willingness to pay to reduce risks actually varies with age.  One 
possibility is to use labor market estimates of how the VSL varies with 
age.
  In the absence of empirical evidence, one can divide the 
estimated VSL of $7 million by the average remaining lifetime or 
discounted expected remaining years of life for those workers to calculate a 
value per life year.  Doing so implicitly assumes that each life year is 
equally attractive. 
109  Early studies in this vein imposed empirical constraints on the 
VSL-age relationship that did not permit the relationship to be flexible, 
with the result that they estimated VSL to be a decreasing function of the 
worker’s age.110  More recent studies have made more refined attempts to 
explore the age variations in VSL.  A recent paper by Viscusi and Aldy has 
used age-specific fatality rates to explore how labor market premiums for 
fatality risks vary with worker age.111  Although the VSL does display an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with respect to individual age, for the oldest 
worker group examined, those who were aged fifty-five to sixty-two, the 
VSL remains substantial and is on the order of $6 million.112
Another study of labor market variations in VSL with respect to age by 
Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak has focused on how recognizing the life-cycle 
pattern of consumption affects one’s age-adjusted estimates of VSL.
 
113  
Individual affluence rises over time, as does individual consumption, with 
the peak value occurring around age fifty.114  This relationship in turn 
influences the life-cycle pattern of VSL.115  While the VSL does in fact 
display an inverted U-shaped pattern, the pattern for older age groups is 
relatively flat.116
 
 108. See id. 
  Their estimates of the VSL for the oldest age group that 
they studied, those fifty-seven to sixty-five, indicated that using age-
adjusted estimates of the VSL may actually increase estimated benefits 
 109. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 7; see generally VISCUSI & 
ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104. 
 110. For a review of these studies, see Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 
50. 
 111. See generally VISCUSI & ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104. 
 112. Id. at 12-13. 
 113. See generally Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & James P. Ziliak, Life-Cycle 
Consumption and the Age-Adjusted Value of Life, 5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & 
POL’Y 1 (2006). 
 114. Id. at 2, 26-27. 
 115. See generally id. 
 116. Id. at 26. 
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rather than decrease them, if the estimates for fifty-seven to sixty-five year 
olds are reflective of the VSL for those over age sixty-five.117
What these studies suggest is that arbitrary reductions in VSL for 
different groups in society should be based on empirical evidence rather 
than on conjectures about how these values differ across society.  In this 
instance, the role of age is quite complex, given that one’s resources and 
attitudes toward risk change over time, just as does one’s remaining life 
expectancy.  Overall, willingness to pay to reduce risks of death does not 
decline proportionally with one’s expected remaining lifetime.
 
118
Notwithstanding the lack of strong evidence for a substantial senior 
discount, there still remains the practical task of how to value different 
lifespans.  Suppose an air pollution regulation will extend the lives of those 
with advanced respiratory disease by only two months?  Surely, a VSL of 
$7 million is too high.  Developing meaningful estimates for such a 
population’s willingness to pay for reduced risks to life remains an open 
challenge, as does the development of meaningful VSL levels for children. 
 
Should Income Levels Matter? 
The operative benefit principle is society’s willingness to pay, which in 
turn is intrinsically linked to people’s ability to pay.  Are we troubled by 
the fact that poor people have a different risk-cost tradeoff than do the more 
affluent?  It is for good reason that the appropriate benefit measure is 
linked to people’s willingness to pay, in that this willingness-to-pay 
measure is a reflection of their actual preferences.119
As a practical matter, distinctions based on income have played a much 
  Engaging in thought 
experiments about what regulations poor people would prefer if they had 
the same income as Bill Gates or that of a government official making over 
$100,000 per year will, of course, lead us to different policy choices, but 
these will not be choices that enhance the welfare of the poor as they 
perceive it.  It is likely that none of my colleagues at their current income 
levels would find boosting their income by moonlighting doing high-rise 
construction work to be an attractive venture.  Indeed, it is doubtful that I 
could find many recruits for any blue-collar job, but the fact that these 
positions are not in accord with their preferences does not mean that the 
welfare of those in these positions would be enhanced if we banned all 
employment in jobs that did not provide for the same safety levels that we 
experience as law school professors. 
 
 117. Id. at 27. 
 118. VISCUSI & ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104, at 15-17. 
 119. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1942-43. 
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less prominent role in regulatory contexts than in the courts.120  The present 
value of lost earnings approach yields valuations that are proportional to 
income.  If one recognized the positive income elasticity of VSL, then there 
would be a 0.5 to 0.6 elasticity of VSL with respect to income.121  
However, I know of no policy context in which there has ever been an 
attempt to distinguish VSL based on income levels.  Rather, the same 
average VSL is applied to all benefits, with the result being that there is 
implicit redistribution to those who have a lower VSL.122
One context in which I have confronted this distributional concern is 
with respect to airline safety.  In my work through a consulting firm that 
contracted to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), I analyzed what 
VSL should be used to assess airline safety.  Because airline passengers are 
more affluent than the average person killed in auto crashes, I 
recommended that the FAA be permitted to regulate airline safety more 
stringently than highway safety, and I coupled that suggestion with a 
broader recommendation that the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT) raise the value of life that it applies throughout the agency.
 
123  
Although my recommendation that the FAA be permitted to use a different 
value of life than elsewhere in the DOT was not adopted, the DOT has 
raised the value-of-life benefit figure that it uses for regulatory policy 
purposes.124
It is useful to articulate what I believe should be a general principle with 
respect to the treatment of income differences.  In the case of airline safety 
regulations, the issue is whether the government should mandate that 
airlines install particular kinds of safety equipment, such as floor lighting, 
fabrics with reduced flammability, and similar improvements to aircraft 
safety that passengers cannot monitor readily.
 
125
 
 120. The present value of lost earnings by definition is proportional to income. OMB 
guidelines for regulatory analysis, such as OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 
  Federal funds are not 
used to pay for these improvements, as these are simply regulatory policies 
16, make no 
provision for income differences. 
 121. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 37. 
 122. I have, however, been present at EPA meetings in which policymakers have argued 
that EPA policies should be accorded a higher VSL for benefit assessment because the risks 
are involuntary, as compared to the risks workers assume on the job. 
 123. The recommendation was made in a meeting I had with FAA officials and 
representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation.  The proposed adjustments 
for income level appear in the final column of Table 4 of Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 
15, at 1930, 1932-33. 
 124. Table 1, infra, documents the change over time in the FAA value of life figures. 
 125. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 
25, 102 [hereinafter Morrall, Review of the Record]. 
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imposing safety requirements on airlines.126
Based on this analysis of the role of income differences, how then 
should we treat the following stylized version of lifeboat access on the 
Titanic?  Suppose that, at the time you purchased your ticket for the 
voyage, you were offered the opportunity to purchase a separate ticket to be 
in a lifeboat, should an emergency arise.  This kind of market situation is 
unusual, as typically there are indivisibilities in the provision of safety 
equipment for airplanes, as regulatory measures such as floor lighting will 
benefit those in coach as well as those in first class.  One would expect the 
more affluent passengers to purchase those tickets because of their higher 
value of statistical life.
  These costs in turn would be 
transmitted to airline passengers through higher prices.  Thus, because in 
the airline safety case it is not the government’s money that pays for the 
safety measure but rather the passengers themselves who ultimately will 
bear the costs, the impetus for designing regulations that reflect the 
tradeoffs passengers would likely make if they were informed about the 
safety of airlines is consistent with their preferences.  If airline safety 
instead was being funded through general tax revenues rather than through 
higher ticket prices, then the case for applying a differential value of life 
would be less compelling.  In the case of highway safety policies that are 
broadly funded by states and the federal government, there may be an 
efficiency rationale for making highways safer in Beverly Hills than in 
Detroit, but because these efforts are publicly funded and not the result of a 
private bargain compelled through government regulation, the equity case 
for such differential values of life is not as strong. 
127
Benefit Values Used by Government Agencies 
  These purchases would be private contracts, and 
would reflect the preferences of the people who chose to purchase the 
ticket or who chose to forgo such a purchase.  The difficulty with this 
market is that at the time of the ticket purchase, the individual is purchasing 
a reduction in the small probability of death, whereas at the time the ticket 
is cashed in for the ride in the lifeboat, death is a certainty for those who do 
not get a lifeboat seat, as opposed to a low probability lottery.  The 
previous market bargains are likely to be untenable at the time the ship is 
sinking. 
Many government agencies utilize value-of-life estimates that are 
 
 126. Those requirements are regulatory constraints, not government expenditure 
programs.  See, e.g., Protective Breathing Equipment, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,452 (proposed Oct. 
10, 1985) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121). 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 123. 
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usually based on my earlier inventory of the VSL studies in the 
literature.128  Table 1 provides a listing of sixteen different regulatory 
analyses and the pertinent values of life used to assess these benefits.129  
The VSL numbers range from a low of $1 million, used by the FAA in 
1985, to a high of $6.3 million, used in many analyses performed by the 
EPA.130  Note that there has been a general increase in the valuations used 
over time, as the FAA value of life number in 1996 is greater than the 
number used by that agency in 1988, which in turn is greater than the 
number used in 1985.131
Although regulatory agencies are often quite diligent in calculating 
benefits and in comparing benefits and costs, because of their restrictive 
legislative mandates many regulations issued generate fewer benefits than 
costs.
 
132  One measure of the cost effectiveness of regulations is the cost 
per statistical life saved.133  As the inventory prepared by John Morrall for 
the OMB indicates, many regulations impose costs per life saved well in 
excess of the $7 million VSL figure.134  Regulations from OSHA and the 
EPA are particularly likely to be above that level, with some regulations 
costing more than $100 million per expected life saved.135  Morrall’s 2003 
analysis updates his widely-cited 1986 table in which he showed that many 
regulations fail such an efficacy test because of the high cost per life 
saved.136  That table included regulations that were promulgated as well as 
those that had been proposed and rejected, and Morrall indicated the final 
status of all entries in the table.137
In terms of the overall assessment for regulatory practice, agencies 
calculate benefits, but estimated benefits are often less than the cost.
 
138
 
 128. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 
  
15, at 1942-43. 
 129. See infra tbl.1; see also Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 55. 
 130. See infra tbl.1. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See generally John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 221 (2003) [hereinafter Morrall, Saving Lives]. 
 133. See id. at 223-24 tbl.1. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Morrall, Review of the Record, supra note 125, at 30. 
 136. See id. at 25-34; see also Morrall, Saving Lives, supra note 132, at 223-24 tbl.1. 
 137. Somewhat curiously, even though Morrall’s table included a footnote indicating 
which were the regulations that had been rejected, he has been criticized for not indicating 
which of the regulations in the list had been rejected.  The same critics who voiced this 
complaint reproduced Morrall’s table omitting the original footnote that listed which 
regulations were simply proposed, which had been rejected, and which were final rules.  
The reproduction of the Morrall table omitting this footnote appears in ACKERMAN & 
HEINZERLING, supra note 2.  Compare Morrall, Review of the Record, supra note 125, at 
102, with ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 46. 
 138. See generally Morrall, Saving Lives, supra note 132. 
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Transportation safety regulations are an exception; these regulations, 
however, are not ideal because the DOT has long used a VSL figure that is 
below the prevailing market estimates of VSL.139
The problem of inadequate attention to balancing benefits and costs also 
pertains to other government policies that are not required to go through the 
rule-making process.  The cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the 
Superfund program has been particularly telling in that regard.
  My hypothesis is that the 
agency may be suffering from an anchoring bias in that it had historically 
used the present value of lost earnings figures applied in automobile 
accident cases to value lives, and that subsequent changes have been 
incremental. 
140  The 
average cost expended per case of cancer averted is over $6 billion, based 
on an extensive study that James T. Hamilton and I did of a very large 
number of hazardous waste sites mandated for cleanup by EPA.141  This 
profligacy is due in part to the absence of any economic efficiency 
requirement as well as the way in which EPA assesses risk benefits.142  
Hypothetically exposed future populations receive the same weight as do 
current populations exposed to the risk.  The result is that cleanups often 
target areas where there are very few people actually at risk, thus diverting 
resources from sites where real risks to existing populations could be 
reduced.143  Thus, sites with low risk reduction benefits are treated the 
same as sites where benefits would be greater if they were estimated 
properly.144
What Hamilton and I have shown is that the cost per case of cancer 
prevented is much lower at sites in which a large segment of the exposed 
population consists of lower-income minorities.
 
145  Thus, targeting 
cleanups based on cost effectiveness from an economic standpoint would 
help the poor, as compared to the current cleanup strategy.146  Thus, the 
claim that there is a tradeoff between efficiency and equity in this instance 
is a false characterization of the policy problem, as greater attention to 
efficiency enhances environmental equity.147
 
 139. See infra tbl.1. 
 
 140. See JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS?  THE SPATIAL AND 
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 109-10 (1999). 
 141. See id. at 125. 
 142. Id. at 25-57 
 143. Id. at 56-57 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 182. 
 146. Id. at 176-86. 
 147. Id. at 188. 
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Stated Preference Approaches148
In situations in which market data are not readily available, economists 
have frequently used contingent valuation or stated preference models to 
elicit people’s willingness to pay for various risk and environmental 
outcomes.
 
149  These survey techniques have addressed a wide variety of 
outcomes.  Among the health outcomes that have been valued are the 
saving of lives of post-heart attack victims, reduction of airline fatalities, 
throat congestion, headaches, bleach poisonings, skin poisonings, toilet 
bowl cleaner gassings, child poisonings, nerve disease, nonfatal lymphoma, 
and severe chronic bronchitis.150
These survey methods achieved substantial prominence with respect to 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  To assess natural resource damages, 
economists on behalf of the state of Alaska and on behalf of the U.S. 
Department of Justice ran surveys to determine the value that people place 
on such oil spills.
 
151
These methodologies have aroused considerable controversy, stimulated 
in large part by the substantial stakes of the Exxon Valdez litigation.
  I was a consultant and expert witness for the U.S. 
Department of Justice and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration team. 
152
 
 148. For discussion of some stated preference methods, the widespread use of stated 
preference approaches in the federal government, and criteria for sound stated preference 
studies, see OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 
  
16, at 22-24. 
 149. See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some 
Number Better Than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 45. 
 150. A review of these health-related studies appears in Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra 
note 15, at 1940-41.  For a wide range of EPA studies of these and other related benefits 
matters, see National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Publications, [hereinafter EPA STUDIES] 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Publications.html.  For an example of 
EPA’s use of my chronic bronchitis research, see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990 TO 2010, at H-15 (1999), (“[T]he valuation of chronic 
bronchitis is based on the distribution of WTP responses from Viscusi et al. (1991).”) (citing 
W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat & Joel Huber, Pricing Environmental Health Risks: 
Survey Assessments of Risk-Risk and Risk-Dollar Trade-Offs for Chronic Bronchitis, 21 J. 
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 32 (1991) [hereinafter Viscusi et al., Environmental Health Risks]) 
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1990-2010/fullrept.pdf.  The chronic bronchitis 
analysis makes an adjustment to willingness to pay to account for the less severe nature of 
the chronic bronchitis cases reduced by the Clean Air Act.  This value has become the 
standard chronic bronchitis valuation figure for air rules related to particulate matter. 
 151. See VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 780.  For the 
original report on the State of Alaska analysis of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, see RICHARD T. 
CARSON ET AL., A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY OF LOST PASSIVE USE VALUES 
RESULTING FROM THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL (1992), 
http://www.rff.org/~kopp/Reports/contingentvaluation.pdf. 
 152. See Diamond & Hausman, supra note 149, at 51 n.10. 
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Economists funded by Exxon criticized the contingent valuation approach 
because survey estimates did not satisfy basic principles of rationality.153  
Thus, for example, people should be willing to pay more to save 10,000 
birds than to save 100 birds, whereas surveys suggested that people were 
not responsive to the scope of the commodity being saved.154  Somewhat 
surprisingly, left-wing critics of the stated preference methodology, such as 
Ackerman and Heinzerling, have allied themselves with these corporate 
critiques and expressed a substantial skepticism of the use of such survey 
methods.155
Since the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill debate, there has been 
considerable progress in the development of survey methodologies, and 
these developments make it possible to overcome the earlier shortcomings.  
OMB, for example, has outlined the criteria that such stated preference 
methods should satisfy in order to develop credible estimates.
  Presumably these same critics who opposed the use of stated 
preference methods for regulatory analysis would not also have opposed 
the use of survey techniques to determine the natural resource damages 
caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill if survey methods were the only 
means for developing such an estimate. 
156  These 
guidelines include accurate characterization of the good being purchased by 
the respondent, and a credible payment mechanism.157
For the past eight years, Joel Huber and I have been developing survey 
techniques to value what the benefit to the country is of clean lakes, rivers, 
and streams.  Using a nationally representative sample of thousands of 
respondents, we found that people were able to give quite consistent 
answers that passed a wide variety of rationality tests.
 
158  Unlike the 100 
birds being equivalent to 10,000 birds phenomenon found in the surveys 
from over a decade ago, our survey structure yielded results in which more 
environmental quality was consistently preferred to less.159
 
 153. See id. at 51 n.10, 52-53. 
  Similarly, 
 154. See, e.g., id. at 51-52; see also William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural 
Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in 
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993). 
 155. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 94-98.  For a recent response to the 
Ackerman and Heinzerling critique, see the article by EPA senior economist Alan Carlin, 
The New Challenge to Cost-Benefit Analysis, REGULATION, Fall 2005, at 18, 20. 
 156. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 22-23. 
 157. For more discussion of these criteria, see id. at 23. 
 158. W. KIP VISCUSI & JOEL HUBER, HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING OF PUBLIC GOODS 8 
(2005), http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2006/0107_1015_1103.pdf.  
 159. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Joel Huber & Jason Bell, The Value of Regional 
Water Quality Improvements (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., 
Faculty Discussion Paper Series No. 477, 2004) [hereinafter Viscusi et al., Water Quality 
Improvements], available at 
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lower costs for environmental improvement were consistently preferred to 
higher costs.160  Responses to the survey also passed complicated 
dominance tests, as subjects preferred alternatives on two dimensions that 
were dominant choices from an economic standpoint.161
In addition to passing these various rationality tests, the study also met 
OMB’s criteria for sound survey design, and OMB approved every pretest 
and final field version of the survey.  The survey text defined the 
commodity to be valued—improvements in water quality—in great detail 
so that respondents would understand the good.  The payment mechanism 
of higher cost of living after moving to a new region was also well 
understood and was a credible payment vehicle. 
 
The survey methodology we used was a series of iterative choices that 
parallels the approach we used in other studies, such as the chronic 
bronchitis analysis that has been used for benefit assessment purposes by 
the EPA.162  Since there seems to be some misunderstanding on the part of 
people such as Ackerman and Heinzerling as to how the interview structure 
works, it is worthwhile to elaborate a bit on the survey methodology.163  
Figure 1 provides a sample water quality benefit valuation question.164
FIGURE 1.  SAMPLE PRIVATE WATER QUALITY BENEFIT QUESTION 
 
 
We would like to ask you some more questions like these.  In these 
questions, however, one region will have a lower annual cost of living and 
the other will have higher water quality.  REMEMBER THAT THE NATIONAL 
AVERAGE FOR WATER QUALITY IS 65% GOOD. 
 
 Region 1 Region 2  
    
Increase in $100 $300  
 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/477.pdf. 
 160. See id. 
 161. An example of a dominated alternative is that a policy improvement of fifteen 
percent in water quality for $200 is dominated by an improvement of twenty percent for 
$200.  Rational respondents should prefer a twenty percent improvement to a fifteen percent 
improvement if they are both equally costly. 
 162. See generally Viscusi et al., Environmental Health Risks, supra note 150. 
 163. In particular, they claim that only two-thirds of the respondents were able to 
understand the interview.  See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 96.  The one-
third figure includes people who were not only inconsistent but also includes people who hit 
the corners of the iterative choice decision structure, and consequently does not reflect 
people who did not understand the interview structure.  See id. 
 164. See infra fig.1; see also VISCUSI & HUBER, supra note 158, at 33. 
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Annual Cost 
Of Living 
More 
Expensive 
More 
Expensive 
    
Percent of Lake 
Acres and River 
Miles With 
Good 
Water Quality 
40% 
Good 
Water 
Quality 
60% 
Good 
Water 
Quality 
 
    
Which Region 
Would you 
Prefer? 
Region 1 
* 
Region 2 
* 
No Preference 
* 
 
The individual has a choice between two regions, as region 2 offers a 
greater level of water quality that is rated good but at an annual cost of 
living of an additional $200.165
Only five percent of the respondents gave inconsistent responses to the 
series of iterative choice questions that forced respondents to consider 
tradeoffs between cost of living and water quality in pairwise regional 
choices.
  Respondents who did not express 
indifference to a first choice such as this considered a series of four 
subsequent choices, including a final dominated choice.  Individuals who 
failed to pass the dominance test were labeled “inconsistent,” and people 
who hit the corners of the valuation task tree were not achieving 
indifference and had implied values that would be estimated statistically. 
166
 
 165. See supra fig.1. 
  Based on the initial choice, respondents’ valuations are 
bounded from above or below depending on whether they pick the high 
cost of living-higher water quality region or the low cost of living-lower 
water quality region.  Respondents are then given a series of iterative 
choices to refine their answers further.  Of these, eventually 3,254 of our 
respondents reached a point of indifference regarding the choices presented 
to them, while 403 respondents continued to prefer the high water quality 
option, and 346 continued to prefer the lower cost of living option.  The 
fact that there are 749 respondents who are at the corners of this sequential 
decision choice does not imply that they did not understand the interview, 
or that the methodology was unsuccessful.  Using two-limit Tobit 
estimates, it is feasible to estimate what their responses would have been 
had the iterative choice process continued indefinitely; the procedure 
 166. The results below are based on unpublished computer runs for our ongoing analysis 
of water quality benefits for the EPA. 
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estimates the value of water quality for the sample by, in effect, taking into 
account what the responses would be had they not hit the upper limit in the 
survey structure.  Quite interestingly, these Tobit results were quite stable 
across the various iterations, implying mean valuations of $31 for each unit 
increase in water quality improvement in a 90-mile radius of one’s home 
region. 
EPA and other agencies continue to rely on stated preference 
methodologies because benefit assessment is quite central to the policy 
valuation process.167
What Should Get Monetized?  Real Versus Imaginary Benefits 
  In a world of limited resources, eventually tradeoffs 
must be made, and the monetization of these benefits serves to put these 
quite disparate commodities in comparable terms. 
An interesting policy problem stimulated in part by a question posed by 
Paul Portney is the weight that people should place on real benefits as 
opposed to imaginary benefits.168
The broader question raised by this example for benefits assessment is 
the extent to which the government should monetize imaginary risks as 
opposed to real risks.  The fact that people have irrational fears does not 
seem to warrant the calculation of any health benefit, although there might 
be some small benefit in terms of anxiety reduction that might be better 
addressed through an informational campaign rather than squandering 
resources.  The principle I will advocate here is that monetization of 
benefits should be restricted to placing dollar values on the estimates of the 
expected number of lives saved based on scientific evidence rather than on 
  Consider the following variant on his 
Happyville problem.  Suppose that there are two risks facing a population.  
The first chemical exposure actually imposes negligible cancer risk, but 
people believe the risk to be one in 1000.  The second chemical actually 
does pose a risk, and people accurately assess this risk as being one in 
10,000.  Because the population in this town is 10,000, people believe that 
the expected number of deaths that could be prevented by addressing the 
first risk is ten, where in fact it is zero, while the expected number of deaths 
from the second chemical is one.  If the cost of cleanup is identical for both 
chemicals and there are only sufficient funds to clean up one of these two 
chemicals, recognition of the primary role of citizen sovereignty would 
clearly lead to addressing the imaginary risk from chemical one and 
ignoring the real risk from chemical two. 
 
 167. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 168. For Portney’s conjecture, see Paul R. Portney, Trouble in Happyville, 11 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 131, 131-32 (1992). 
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public perceptions.  For the same kinds of reasons that we would not want 
to ignore risks that are not known to the public, such as the hidden dangers 
of occupational carcinogens, we would also not want to misallocate 
resources by addressing risks that the public believes to be greater than is 
actually the case. 
In some instances, government agencies may foster excessive emphasis 
on these imaginary risks.  As noted above, by focusing on risks to 
hypothetical future populations, the EPA often places undue emphasis on 
imaginary risks that will never come to pass.169  Justice Stephen Breyer 
recounts an example of a case in his court in which a Superfund site was 
clean enough for children to play on the site and eat small amounts of dirt 
for seventy days a year, but after that site was cleaned up, children would 
be able to eat the dirt for 245 days per year.170  Justice Breyer was puzzled 
because “there were no dirt-eating children playing in the area, for it was a 
swamp.  Nor were dirt-eating children likely to appear there, for future 
building seemed unlikely.”171
Risk-Risk Analysis 
  This excessive focus on imaginary risks 
rather than real risks distorts our priorities and actually has a perverse 
distribution effect. 
When monetizing the benefits of government policies, it is essential to 
monetize the net health and safety benefits, not the gross benefits.  There 
may be a variety of benefit offsets, such as decreased consumer precautions 
in the presence of safety caps, which I termed the “lulling effect.”172  There 
also could be ancillary safety benefits, as hypothesized by Rascoff and 
Revesz.173
The focus here will be on the concept of risk-risk analysis in the sense of 
health-risk increases that result from the opportunity costs of policy 
expenditures.  The underlying principle is that being richer is healthier, as 
there is a positive income elasticity of health and safety levels.
 
174
 
 169. See id. 
  Judge 
 170. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 12 (1993). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, for example, my discussion in VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 12, 
224-27. 
 173. See generally Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff 
Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1763 (2002). 
 174. The first documentation of this relationship in the professional literature is W. Kip 
Viscusi, Wealth Effects and Earnings Premiums for Job Hazards, 60 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
408 (1978). 
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Stephen Williams brought the risk-risk concept to the forefront of the 
policy debate, when he observed that very expensive OSHA regulations 
could lead to a net decrease in safety.175  The rationale is that very high 
levels of expenditure represent an opportunity cost and take money away 
from consumers that could otherwise be used for health-enhancing 
expenditures, such as health care, safer products, and safer 
neighborhoods.176  Although Judge Williams focused on existing published 
estimates that indicated that expenditures of under $10 million per life 
saved could be counterproductive, low estimates appear to be implausible, 
since it is unlikely that expenditures comparable to the value of statistical 
life could reduce safety levels.177  On a theoretical basis there should be a 
linkage between the value of life from the standpoint of prevention and the 
level of expenditure that leads to the loss of a statistical life.178  In 
particular, I showed that the marginal expenditure per statistical life lost 
equals the VSL divided by the marginal propensity to spend on health from 
one’s income.179  If we focus only on health-enhancing expenditures, then 
the marginal propensity to spend on health is approximately 0.1, so that the 
level of expenditure that will lead to the loss of a statistical life is $70 
million if the value of life is $7 million.180  Higher levels of expenditure 
may also lead to consumption that harms oneself.181  Recognizing these 
influences leads to a lower estimate of the expenditure level per life saved 
that would be counterproductive.182
A set of examples in Table 2 illustrates that recognition of risk-risk 
tradeoffs affects the estimates of benefits.
 
183  For that series of regulations, 
the authors calculate the net lives saved by regulations, taking into account 
the risk-risk tradeoffs.184
 
 175. See Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(Williams, J., concurring). 
  To monetize the benefits of these regulations, 
 176. See id. 
 177. For an example of the kind of risk-risk analysis cited by Judge Williams, see Ralph 
L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147 
(1990). 
 178. See Randall Lutter, John F. Morrall III & W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-Saved 
Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599, 605 (1999). 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id.  Using an estimated VSL of $5 million, that article concluded that an 
expenditure of $15 million will lead to the loss of a statistical life.  Use of a $7 million VSL 
figure rather than a $5 million figure will increase that estimate proportionately. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See infra tbl.2; see also ROBERT W. HAHN, RANDALL W. LUTTER & W. KIP VISCUSI, 
DO FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? 16-17 (2000) [hereinafter HAHN ET AL., 
REDUCE MORTALITY]. 
 184. See HAHN ET AL., REDUCE MORTALITY, supra note 183, at 16-17. 
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one could then apply the VSL of $7 million to the net lives saved figure, 
which will produce an estimate of the net monetary safety benefits resulting 
from the regulation.  As indicated in the table, many of these health and 
safety regulations are counterproductive in terms of their net effects on 
health and safety.185
Although the “richer is safer” argument may appear to be 
counterintuitive, the following example shows the mechanisms at work.  
Suppose that regulatory policy was no more productive than paying people 
to dig ditches and fill them back up again.  This level of efficacy is not too 
far removed from many of the most inefficient regulations.  By diverting 
consumer expenditures through taxes, higher prices, or lower wages from 
the usual bundle of consumption goods, such a ditch-digging policy will 
impose net health costs through the opportunity costs of the money being 
expended. 
 
Ackerman and Heinzerling criticize this risk-risk approach and express 
puzzlement that advocates of the risk-risk methodology have never 
suggested applying this methodology to other types of expenditure, such as 
military spending.186  The genesis of the risk-risk methodology in policy 
contexts stems from the fact that regulatory agencies such as OSHA and 
EPA have a myopic risk-oriented approach.187  Unlike other government 
policies, risk regulation costs do not come out of general revenues, so there 
are no internal budgetary restrictions.188
To the best of my knowledge, a purely health-and-safety scorecard is not 
used outside of the risk and environmental regulation arena.  If, however, 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services were to fund 
  If cost does not enter policy 
evaluations on equal footing with benefits, or possibly not count at all 
because of agencies’ restrictive legislative mandates, then in the extreme 
case the only scorecard component that matters is how a regulation 
performs from a risk standpoint.  What the risk-risk methodology points 
out is that even if all we are about is health and safety with cost as a matter 
of complete indifference, truly wasteful expenditures on regulations are 
still not advancing that objective.  Thus, it provides a way to open the 
policy debate to evaluate truly ineffective policies in situations in which 
only risk effects seem to be of concern to policymakers. 
 
 185. Id. at 19. 
 186. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 59. 
 187. In some instances, costs cannot be considered at all.  See VISCUSI, FATAL 
TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 261. 
 188. As a result there have been proposals that agencies be subject to a regulatory budget, 
as discussed in W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE 
WORKPLACE 152-55 (1983). 
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healthcare programs that saved statistical lives at a cost of $100 million per 
life, then the same type of argument regarding the counterproductive nature 
of such expenditures would be pertinent.  Exorbitant expenditures on health 
and safety do not have a net beneficial effect on health. 
Monetizing Benefits for Policy 
A substantial dividend from the monetization of the benefits from risk 
and environmental regulation is that doing so has placed these benefits on 
equal footing with the quite tangible costs of these regulations.  These 
benefits no longer are subsidiary qualitative considerations.189  The 
importance of valuing benefits and the extent to which placing such 
benefits on an equitable basis with costs is apparent based on the history of 
regulatory oversight of new government regulations.190
The original regulatory oversight process was only concerned with costs, 
not benefits.
 
191  Costs were tangible monetary losses, while benefits were 
seemingly nebulous and more abstract environmental amenities.192  The 
Nixon administration initiated informal “quality of life” reviews that 
focused on the cost of impact regulations on the economy.193  The Ford 
administration formalized this process through Executive Order 11,821, 
which required agencies to prepare inflationary impact analyses of the costs 
of these regulations.194  Once again, all that mattered were the monetized 
costs, not the benefits, even though these also potentially could be 
translated into monetary terms.195
The Carter administration regulatory oversight effort of Executive Order 
12,044 expanded the requirements to include cost-effectiveness tests.
 
196  
The agency had to show that it was achieving the particular benefits of the 
regulation for the least possible cost.197
 
 189. RICHARD L. BERKMAN & W. KIP VISCUSI, DAMMING THE WEST: RALPH NADER’S 
STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 75 (1973). 
  As with the Ford administration 
 190. The documentation of the history based on the discussion below appears in VISCUSI 
ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24-33. 
 191. See id. at 24. 
 192. This observation is based on my experience in supervising all new major federal 
regulation from 1979-1980 as Deputy Director of the President’s Council on Wage and 
Price Stability. 
 193. VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24. 
 194. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 29, 1974); see also VISCUSI ET 
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24. 
 195. See VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24. 
 196. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 23, 1978); see also VISCUSI ET 
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 25. 
 197. VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 25. 
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program, this regulatory effort was run by the White House Council on 
Wage and Price Stability, for which I was the Deputy Director.  The main 
focus remained on costs and inflationary impact of regulation, though the 
concerns were expanded to include cost effectiveness.  Perhaps because of 
this emphasis, the kinds of monetization that are the focus of my paper 
were not yet undertaken by regulatory agencies.  For example, agencies did 
not use VSL to value the benefits of regulatory efforts or undertake stated 
preference surveys to determine the value of environmental amenities. 
Once the Reagan administration required that agencies demonstrate that 
the benefits of regulation exceeded the costs, agencies could either quantify 
the cost effects in monetary terms and compare them to the risk and 
environmental benefits described in a qualitative manner, or they could 
explore more innovative approaches to try to capture the extent to which 
there were real and tangible benefits from these regulatory efforts.198  As I 
indicated in my discussion of the OSHA hazard communication regulation, 
OSHA began using my value-of-life estimates beginning in 1982, in part 
because this methodology greatly enhanced the attractiveness of regulatory 
policies, given the substantial benefits this economic approach accorded to 
reducing risks to human life.199  Perhaps for much the same reason, the 
EPA has been at the forefront of developing and funding research efforts to 
place a dollar value on environmental amenities, ranging from improved 
visibility of the Grand Canyon to the value that improvements of water 
quality will have to people who do not even use bodies of water for fishing, 
swimming, or other recreational purposes.200
The development of new techniques for monetizing benefits has led to 
new controversies, both because the empirical methods themselves remain 
in the process of development, and because there has been an effort to 
extend and refine the estimates in a variety of ways.
 
201
 
 198. See id. at 27. 
  In the case of 
valuing statistical lives, use of these numbers is no longer regarded as 
controversial by regulatory agencies, as their application in benefit 
assessments has become routine.  The issues that are now at the forefront of 
the policy agenda involve refinements in how such values can be applied.  
Most notably, the debate over whether there should be a senior discount for 
the value placed on the lives of the elderly for the Clear Skies Initiative 
exemplifies the extent to which there are clearly contentious issues arising 
 199. As discussed above, these value-of-life estimates led to an OSHA regulation being 
assessed as having benefits in excess of costs, whereas the earlier approach led to the 
opposite conclusion.  See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. 
 200. See EPA STUDIES, supra note 150. 
 201. See Carlin, supra note 155, at 20. 
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from the application of different values for different segments of the 
population.202  My past work indicates that the magnitude of age 
differences in VSL is not that substantial, and that the policy debate should 
not become mired in such subsidiary controversies.203  The more 
fundamental challenge is to strike a reasonable overall balance between 
cost and risk.204  Engaging in more contentious debates regarding the 
differences in the value of life across segments of the population seems 
premature given that more fundamental lack of benefit-cost balance in 
regulatory policies.205
A substantial dividend from the monetization of risk and environmental 
regulatory impacts is that this process links these benefits to the 
fundamental economic determinants of benefit values, which is the 
willingness to pay of those affected by a regulation for the effects of these 
policies.
 
206  In the case of VSL, these estimates are typically derived from 
the preferences that workers reveal through their risky job choices and the 
wage premiums they receive for risk.207  In the case of other environmental 
benefits, the main focus has been on a variety of stated preference 
approaches that elicit measures of the willingness to pay for the 
environmental benefit.208
The advent of stated preference methods has in turn created new 
components of benefits that could substantially loom large in the benefit 
assessment process.  Perhaps the most controversial benefit component is 
that of nonuse or passive use of an environmental resource.
  By their very nature, the valuations derived from 
market evidence will reflect preferences of the citizenry. 
209
 
 202. See Christine Todd Whitman, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Statement at the 
Aging Initiative Public Listening Session (May 7, 2003) (renouncing the senior discount),  
http://www.epa.gov/aging/listening/2003/balt_ctw.htm. 
  Historically, 
economists valued the use of improved environmental resources through 
the recreational value of, or the travel costs that people incurred to visit the 
environmental site.  The use of stated preference approaches has greatly 
expanded the scope of such benefits to include the value of benefits to 
 203. VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 30. 
 204. See id. at 31-32. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Id. at 17. 
 207. Id. at 42-49. 
 208. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE 
FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE, at ES-3, http://www.epa.gov/ttncaaa1/t1ria.html (follow 
“Executive Summary” hyperlink). 
 209. See Richard T. Carson et al., Was the NOAA Panel Correct About Contingent 
Valuation? (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 96-20, 1996), available at 
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-96-20.pdf. 
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people who do not even directly use the environmental amenity.210  Thus, 
in the case of water quality benefits, people who do not fish, visit 
recreational areas, or picnic at these rivers or lakes may nevertheless 
express fairly substantial values for improvements in water quality in their 
region as well as elsewhere in the country.211  Nonuse benefits are 
legitimate but often difficult to measure, making this benefit category a 
prime target of critics of regulatory policies.212  As with market-based 
estimates, these elicited values will reflect the willingness to pay of the 
citizenry.213  The scope of the benefits that can be captured through the 
monetization of environmental benefits is quite broad and is not limited to 
the kinds of activities for which one normally conceives that a market 
arrangement might be appropriate.214
Put somewhat differently, any regulatory benefit from a risk regulation 
or environmental regulation that should be legitimately recognized in the 
policy analysis process can potentially be quantified in monetary terms.  
Doing so will enable these benefits to reflect the values of the people who 
are affected by the regulation rather than the preferences of policymakers 
who would otherwise seek to impose their own values on the citizenry. 
 
My support for the monetization of environmental benefits began over 
three decades ago with my involvement as co-author of a Nader study 
group study analyzing the dam building efforts of the U.S. Department of 
Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation.215
Why shouldn’t environmental consequences of Reclamation projects also 
be given dollar values?  Without such consideration, “tangible benefits” 
such as irrigation or power overshadow ecological effects.  For example, 
in the 1960s the Bureau of Reclamation wanted to flood major portions of 
  That agency could only undertake 
policies for which the benefits exceeded the costs.  Quantified benefits such 
as irrigation and electric power were tallied, but environmental 
consequences were not, with the result being that they were largely 
ignored.  As our report concluded: 
 
 210. See, e.g., Viscusi et al., Water Quality Improvements, supra note 159, at 12 (noting 
that nonusers are permitted to value water quality, but people who visit lakes and rivers have 
a higher value). 
 211. Users have a twenty-eight percent higher value.  Id. 
 212. SUSAN E. DUDLEY & BRIAN F. MANNIX, MERCATUS  CTR., GEORGE MASON UNIV., 
PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET’S DRAFT 
GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND THE FORMAT OF 
ACCOUNTING STATEMENTS 10-13 (2003), https://www.mercatus.org/pdf/materials/314.pdf 
 213. If the survey sample consists of populations reflective of the preferences of those 
affected by the policy, this will be true. 
 214. For example, valuation of water quality in Viscusi et al., Water Quality 
Improvements, supra note 159, does not deal with water being sold. 
 215. See BERKMAN & VISCUSI, supra note 189. 
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the Grand Canyon by building Bridge Canyon and Marble Canyon dams 
on the Colorado.  As usual, the Bureau paid lip service to environmental 
considerations in the narrative section of its project reports.  However, 
when it came to placing dollar values on project effects, environmental 
impacts weren’t mentioned at all and played no part in the benefit-cost 
evaluation.  Consequently, the Bureau of Reclamation added up the 
“tangible” benefits and costs of its projects, found that the dollar value of 
benefits exceeded the estimated costs, concluded that the projects were 
economically justified, and sent them on to Congress.216
How, then, did the efforts to dam up the Grand Canyon get stopped?  
Economist Dr. Alan Carlin, who is now a senior economist at the EPA, 
showed with a co-author that the quantified benefits in fact did not exceed 
the costs.
 
217  His analysis, however, turned not on adverse environmental 
effects, which were not readily monetized in that era of economic analysis, 
but on the overestimation of electric power benefits.  It may be that Dr. 
Carlin’s misgivings about the Priceless approach,218
CONCLUSION 
 as well as my own 
resistance to the Priceless point of view, stems in part from our longer 
historical perspective.  The government has already run the experiment of 
analyzing proposed programs with major environmental effects but not 
monetizing the environmental consequences.  The result was not that these 
effects were treated as being “priceless,” but instead were viewed as being 
worthless. 
The Priceless approach consequently has taken us full circle.  In the 
early era of policy analyses, there were efforts to quantify benefit 
components for goods traded in markets, but risk and environmental 
consequences were not monetized.  The result was that monetized benefits 
took precedence.  After President Reagan required that new regulations 
pass a test that benefits exceed costs, the efforts to monetize risk and 
environmental effects expanded, often accompanied by the development of 
new methodologies to ascertain society’s willingness to pay for risk and 
environmental benefits.  Efforts to quantify benefit components such as 
nonuse values for the environment have long been opposed by industry 
groups who are defendants in natural resource damages cases in which the 
values are being used to assess damages.  Consideration of nonuse values 
has also been opposed by conservative critics who are fearful that these 
assessments will lead to overly ambitious policies.  The advocates of the 
 
 216. Id. at 75. 
 217. See id. at 75-76, 91. 
 218. For Dr. Carlin’s views, see Carlin, supra note 155. 
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Priceless approach have joined forces with these groups, but from the 
opposite perspective, arguing that no finite monetary value is appropriate.  
Each of these anti-monetization schools of thought loses sight of the 
overriding purpose of policy assessment.  The benefit valuation task 
remains that of determining society’s willingness to pay for the policy.  
Monetization of benefits remains the soundest approach for doing so in a 
manner that will give these effects standing in the regulatory policy 
process. 
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TABLE 1. VALUES OF STATISTICAL LIFE USED BY U.S. REGULATORY 
AGENCIES, 1985-2000219
Year 
 
Agency Regulation 
Value of  a 
Statistical Life 
(millions,  
2000 $) 
1985 Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Protective Breathing Equipment (50 Fed. Reg. 41,452) $1.0 
    1985 Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Gasoline Lead 
Content (50 Fed. Reg.  9,400) 
$1.7 
    1988 Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Improved Survival Equipment for Inadvertent Water 
Landings (53 Fed. Reg. 24,890) 
$1.5 
    1988 Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone (53 Fed. Reg. 
30,566) 
$4.8 
    1990 Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Proposed Establishment of the Harlingen Airport Radar 
Service Area, TX (55 Fed. Reg. 32,064) 
$2.0 
    1994 Food and Nutrition 
Service (USDA) 
National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast 
Program (59 Fed. Reg. 30,218) 
$1.7, $3.5 
    1995 Consumer Product 
Safety Commission 
Multiple Tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices (60 
Fed. Reg. 34,922) 
$5.6 
    1996 Food Safety 
Inspection Service 
(USDA) 
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point Systems (61 Fed. Reg. 38,806) 
$1.9 
    1996 Food and Drug 
Administration 
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of 
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children 
and Adolescents (61 Fed. Reg. 44,396) 
$2.7 
    1996 Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot Training, 
Testing, and Checking and at Training Centers (61 Fed. 
Reg. 34,508) 
$3.0 
    1996 Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Requirements for Lead-Based Paint Activities in 
Target Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities (61 Fed. 
Reg. 45,778) 
$6.3 
    1996 Food and Drug 
Administration 
Medical Devices; Current Good Manufacturing 
Practice Final Rule; Quality System Regulation (61 
Fed. Reg. 52,602) 
$5.5 
     
 219. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 55. 
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1997 Environmental 
Protection Agency 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone (62 
Fed. Reg. 38,856) 
$6.3 
    1999 Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Radon in Drinking Water Health Risk Reduction and 
Cost Analysis (64 Fed. Reg. 9,560) 
$6.3 
    1999 Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: 
Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and 
Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements (65 Fed. Reg. 
6,698) 
$3.9, $6.3 
    2000 Consumer Product 
Safety Commission 
Portable Bed Rails; Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (65 Fed. Reg. 58,968) 
$5.0 
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TABLE 2.  EVALUATION OF RISK-RISK TRADEOFF FOR TWENTY-FOUR 
U.S. REGULATIONS, 1986–1998220
Regulation 
 
Year Agency 
Discounted 
Statistical Lives 
Saved 
Fatalities Induced by 
Cost of Regulations 
Net Lives Saved 
by Regulations 
Toxicity characteristics to determine 
hazardous wastes 
1990 EPA 0.048 -23 23 
Underground storage tanks: technical 
requirements 
1988 EPA 1.1 -22 24 
Manufactured home construction and 
safety standards on wind standards 
1994 HUD 1.5 -3.2 4.7 
Process safety management of highly 
hazardous chemicals 
1992 DOL 220 -42 260 
Regulations restricting the sale and 
distribution of cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco to protect children and 
adolescents 
1996 HHS 4,700 -140 4,900 
Medicare and Medicaid programs: 
hospital conditions of participation; 
identification of potential organ, tissue, 
and eye donors; and transplant hospitals’ 
provision of transplant-related data 
1998 HHS 710 9.2 700 
Quality mammography standards 1997 HHS 75 1.4 74 
Food labeling regulations 1993 HHS 520 10 510 
Childproof lighters 1993 CPSC 95 2.9 92 
Standard for occupational exposure to 
benzene 
1987 DOL 4.4 1.8 2.6 
Occupational exposure to methylene 
chloride 
1997 DOL 12 5.9 6.2 
Occupational exposure to 4,4’ 
methylenedianiline 
1992 DOL 0.7 0.71 -0.01 
 
 220. HAHN ET AL., REDUCE MORTALITY, supra note 183, at 16-17. 
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Regulation Year Agency 
Discounted 
Statistical Lives 
Saved 
Fatalities Induced by 
Cost of Regulations 
Net Lives Saved 
by Regulations 
Asbestos: manufacture, importation, 
processing, and distribution in 
commerce—prohibitions (total) 
1989 EPA 3.9 4.3 -0.41 
National primary and secondary water 
regulations—phase II: maximum 
contaminant levels for 38 contaminants 
1991 EPA 44 63 -19 
Occupational exposure to asbestos 1994 DOL 13 20 -7.1 
Hazardous waste management system—
wood preservatives 
1990 EPA 0.29 0.83 -0.55 
Sewage sludge use and disposal 
regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 503 
1993 EPA 0.24 2.6 -2.3 
Land disposal restrictions for “third third” 
scheduled wastes 
1990 EPA 2.8 30 -27 
Hazardous waste management system: 
final solvents and dioxins land disposal 
restrictions rule 
1986 EPA 1 12 -11 
Occupational exposure to formaldehyde 1987 DOL 0.21 4.8 -4.5 
Prohibit the land disposal of the first third 
of scheduled wastes (“second sixth” 
proposal) 
1988 EPA 2.9 66 -63 
Land disposal restrictions—phase II: 
universal treatment standards and 
treatment standards for organic toxicity, 
characteristic wastes, and newly listed 
wastes 
1994 EPA 0.16 8.3 -8.2 
Drinking water regulations, synthetic 
organic chemicals—phase V 
1992 EPA 0.0061 3.4 -3.4 
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Regulation Year Agency 
Discounted 
Statistical Lives 
Saved 
Fatalities Induced by 
Cost of Regulations 
Net Lives Saved 
by Regulations 
Solid waste disposal facility criteria, 40 
C.F.R. pt. 257 & pt. 258 
1991 EPA 0.0049 10 -10 
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